Party-list System: Quo Vadis?

The issue needs some breathing space, much clearing of previously held notions and impressions. At the heart of the misunderstanding is the impression, mine included and also held by many, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were incorporating the Party-list System into our electoral process primarily to benefit “the poor and marginalized.” This referred to communities which at the time were called basic sectors: labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women and youth. The discourse of the period understood that such communities were under-represented, suffered injustice, and had no one to speak for their interests in Congress.

The party-list system in itself is not designed to do that. What it does is open up the electoral system to enhance the chance of the small political parties or organizations with real constituencies and special interests. These entities, as parties or organizations, would not have the capacity to compete through the legislative district systems which had long been dominated by major political parties and entrenched political actors. It would create a more open and inclusive law making class, such that would reflect the diverse, sometimes, competing and contradictory interests and objectives of different constituencies. These naturally include those working with the basic sectors mentioned above.

As an instrument of democracy, the party-list system could well result in stronger policies favoring these sectors. It could give way to outstanding sectoral representatives who will take their causes in policy debate. But it does not in any way assure or guarantee this. As we have seen in our limited and imperfect experiment.

Indeed, some of the delegates in the Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) of 1987 wanted to secure a Congressional bias for the poor and marginalized. The Con-Con drew from the communities who had emerged fresh from the turmoil of people’s protest against Ferdinand Marcos’ strong man rule which had held the country for close to 15 years. These delegates were drawn from a mix of former public officials, experts and academics, lawyers and civil society leaders who had championed those without power, taking up the causes of workers, urban poor, farmers and fisherfolk, women and children – and saw the toppling of the dictatorship as the first step. But there were other delegates who looked at the Constitution from other perspectives.

Constitutional expert and Jesuit priest, Joaquin Bernas, saw in the party list the potential instrument of making the ideal of social justice, already enshrined in the 1935 Constitution, a practical reality. And he with famed film director Lino Brocka, now deceased, argued to provide permanent seats in Congress for such groups to vie for.

Alas, the body could not reach a consensus. Permanent seats raised contentious problems about identification of sectors and their representatives.

The Constitution did provide a transitory provision for the appointment by the President of sectoral representatives in Congress in  1987, 1992, and 1995 elections.

In the section on the legislature, the Constitution provides for three consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of the seats reserved for party-list representation to be be filled as provided by law by selection or election from the “labor, peasant urban poor, indigenous, cultural communities, women, youth and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.” With the use of the word “such,” the framers clearly prescribed that those added to the list would have to be of “such” kind, meaning, as the dictionary says: “Being the same as that last mentioned or implied.”

Unfortunately, this provision would hold only for the three terms prescribed. The delegates must have thought that the period would be sufficient for the sectoral groups to grow the kind of capacity to compete with the traditional political forces and win their seats in Congress on their own.

They were mistaken in this hope and expectation; as many are now dismayed by the kinds of groups that have been able to win seats under the party-list system.

I am not sure that even the broad intention of the party-list system has been served. It may have opened up the electoral system and allowed the smaller political parties and other organizations to compete under a different set of rules. But the political culture has taken over the instrument of reform. It reminds me of how families have rotated their members for local government positions and seats in Congress to go around term limits.

Political dynasties did not lose time forming organizations with short histories in any kind of advocacy, assigning family members to lead these. The more the merrier, with additional channels for pork barrel funds and opportunities to manipulate the system of power for their interests.

The case of  Juan Miguel “Mikey” Arroyo, son of then President Gloria Arroyo, running for party-list group for security guards, will long endure in memory as among the most egregiously offensive, as well as most absurd, examples of the quick scramble for party-list seats by unlikely leaders of the poor.

It has also enabled traditional politicians who already have the means to compete through the legislative districts to ease themselves into Congress, with less effort and maybe less expense.

So what have we here?

The quality of Congressional representation, of their debate and discourse in the Lower House has already dramatically and demonstrably declined in recent decades. Listening to their sessions and hearings can be excruciating, as the level of competence combines with arrogance and entitlement. Looking at the list of the petitioners who challenged their disqualification by COMELEC (Commission on Elections), there is little evidence that they will do better.

At this point, we have simply ended up with more of the same, at our expense as taxpayers.

We should all begin to look for the ways with which to do away with this law.