AMPATUAN TRIAL UPDATE: Court denies prosecution bid to turn three accused into state witnesses

CMFR/PHILIPPINES – Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City denied 29 July 2011 the prosecution panel’s bid to turn into state witnesses a former vice mayor and two police officers allegedly involved in the 23 November 2009 massacre in Ampatuan town, Maguindanao.

In an eight-page Omnibus Order, Judge Jocelyn Solis Reyes Judge Jocelyn Solis Reyes said that the motion to discharge from the charges accused Mohammad Sangki, Police Insp. Rex Ariel Diongon, and Police Officer 1 Rainier Ebus and to make them state witnesses filed by the prosecution panel was “bereft of merit.” The prosecution had earlier asked the court to make  P/Insp. Michael Macaraeg, one of those accused of involvement in the massacre a state witness, but withdrew the motion on 17 November 2010.

The court found that “their (Diongon and Ebus) testimony will suffice and may be admitted as gospel truth in the absence of evidence to the contrary,” but Reyes said that “there is no absolute necessity for the testimonies insofar as accused Andal Ampatuan Jr. and Andal Sr. are concerned.”

Reyes also said that “A cursory reading of the foregoing will show that some if not all were likewise the subject of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were earlier presented on the witness stand,” the resolution read, adding that “the testimonies of Diongon, Ebus and Sangki were merely corroborative in nature.”

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules of Court, Rules 110-127) list  the following as requirements for an accused person to be considered as a state witness:

1. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
2. There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
3. The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
4. Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
5. Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

The judge explained that “Such being the case, they do not qualify as state witnesses…when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the said accused whose discharge is requested, as when he alone has knowledge of the crime and not when his testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the evidence in the hands of the prosecution.”

In the same 29 July 2011 order, the court allowed the Andal Jr. to “adduce evidence supportive of his application for bail…after the prosecution has rested its case is confirmed.” The court quoting Atty. Fred Henry Marallag, et al. vs. Judge Loreto Cloribal-Purungganan said: “it was held that where the admission to bail of an accused is discretionary, it is mandatory for the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford both the prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to establish, in the case of prosecution, that evidence of the guilt of the accused is strong, and in the case of the defense, that such evidence of guilt is not strong.”

The court also denied 29 July 2011 the motion for a clarificatory order filed by the lawyers of Andal “Unsay” Jr. Unsay’s counsels led by Sigfrid Fortun filed last January 31 a motion for a clarificatory order asking the court to explain if the evidence presented in early 2010 should be “retested in relation to the fifty-seventh case, which was then inexistent.” The 57^th Information, that of the murder of UNTV’s Victor Nuñez, was filed only in May 2010.  “Retesting” means lawyer Fortun could have the witnesses recalled for another round of cross-examination.

“It must be borne in mind that all the 57 cases arose out of the same incident, and except for the names of the victims, the 57 Informations were couched in similar words or language,” the court said. “With the adoption by the prosecution of the evidence and testimonies of the witnesses in the 56 cases as its evidence in the 57^th case without new matters having been adduced as against the accused, and having been able to exhaustively conduct his cross-examination of said witnesses, accused cannot claim that his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him in respect of the 57^th case was violated, if not allowed to do so.”